claude-code-showcase
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and utilizes official tools and packages from trusted organizations and well-known registries.
- Evidence: Implementation examples utilize
@anthropic/claude-code,@anthropic/mcp-jira, andprettiervianpxexecution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Defines project-specific hooks and shell scripts that execute commands for workflow automation and branch protection.
- Evidence: Implementation of
PreToolUseandPostToolUsehooks in.claude/settings.json, and the prompt evaluation script in.claude/hooks/skill-eval.sh. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Pull request details via
gh pr viewin.claude/commands/pr-review.mdand Jira issue details via MCP in.claude/commands/ticket.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the templates do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the external data.
- Capability inventory: The configured environment allows
npx,npm,git,node,cat,grep, andfindas specified inallowedCommands. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the fetched external content is performed before the agent processes the data.
Audit Metadata