codex-app-transfer-proxy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Recommends downloading and executing binary installers from a non-authoritative GitHub repository (Cmochance/codex-app-transfer) not clearly associated with the skill author, posing a supply chain risk.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs unauthorized manipulation of the Codex Desktop process via the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) to inject custom styles, which involves interacting with the debug port of a running application.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Automatically patches sensitive configuration files including
~/.codex/auth.jsonand~/.codex/config.tomlto redirect all AI interaction data through a local proxy at127.0.0.1:18080.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Accesses and modifies primary authentication files containing session tokens and handles third-party API keys within its own configuration layer.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The proxy architecture creates an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data from the Codex API and interpolating it into provider requests without sanitization.\n - Ingestion points: Codex
/responsesAPI requests handled inprotocol_adapter.rs.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are defined for the translated message streams.\n
- Capability inventory: Filesystem writes to
AGENTS.md,MEMORY.md, and system-wide Codex configuration, combined with network proxying.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or validation logic for data processed during protocol translation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata