opencodex-gateway
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires cloning and installing software from an external, third-party GitHub repository (github.com/AITabby/opencodex). This repository is not a verified or trusted vendor.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions (npm install && npm start) execute arbitrary code from the downloaded repository on the host system with the permissions of the current user.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's primary function involves accessing and patching ~/.codex/config.toml, a sensitive configuration file used to store plaintext API credentials for the Codex Desktop application.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Vision Bridge' and 'Computer Use' features involve capturing full-screen screenshots of the user's desktop and transmitting them to external third-party API endpoints.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Computer Use Engine' allows the AI to programmatically control mouse movements, clicks, and keyboard input on the host machine using native macOS system calls and osascript.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a Vision Bridge that converts visual data into text descriptions and injects them into the prompt. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious text displayed on a user's screen could be interpreted as instructions by the underlying model.
- Ingestion points: Desktop screenshots processed by the Vision Bridge engine (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None specified for the injected screenshot descriptions.
- Capability inventory: Full control over ~/.codex/config.toml, mouse/keyboard automation, and network proxying.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for the text generated from images before prompt injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata