harvard-art-museum-etl-analytics
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user or agent to clone and install code from a third-party GitHub repository (
https://github.com/Manali0711/Harvard-Artifacts-Collection-Data-Engineering-Analytics-App.git) that does not belong to a verified or trusted organization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8):
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
fetch_artifactsfunction from the Harvard Art Museums API inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified to delimit external API content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Includes database write operations (
load_to_database) and interactive visualization displays (show_analytics_page). - Sanitization: Uses parameterized SQL queries for database safety but lacks sanitization or filtering of external text content before it is processed or displayed in the dashboard.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions involve executing shell commands (
git clone,pip install,streamlit run) which lead to the installation and execution of code downloaded from an untrusted source. - [SAFE]: Credentials and API keys are managed using environment variables (
os.getenv) and.envfiles, adhering to recommended secret management practices. - [SAFE]: Network activity is restricted to the legitimate API endpoint for the Harvard Art Museums (
api.harvardartmuseums.org).
Audit Metadata