harvard-art-museums-data-engineering-pipeline
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone a source code repository from a third-party GitHub account (
Manali0711). This creates a dependency on external code that does not originate from the skill's author or a well-known service provider.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides code for a Streamlit dashboard and an ETL pipeline that executes SQL queries and database transactions. It relies on environment variables for sensitive database credentials and performs batch data operations.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from an external API (api.harvardartmuseums.org), which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in the museum's data could potentially influence the application's behavior.\n - Ingestion points: Fetches artifact records and metadata from
https://api.harvardartmuseums.org/object.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or instructions are provided to the agent to treat API data as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within the metadata strings.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes database writes via
mysql.connectorand interactive UI rendering through thestreamlitframework.\n - Sanitization: The code uses parameterized SQL queries (
%s), which is a best practice for preventing direct SQL injection, though it does not fully eliminate risks from malicious logic embedded in processed data that might be rendered in the UI.
Audit Metadata