figma-mcp-cached
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration uses
npx -y @pactortester/figma-mcp-cachedto download and execute code from a third-party source at runtime. The package belongs to a user ('pactortester') that does not match the stated author ('Aradotso') and is not from a known trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The MCP server is initialized via a shell command (
npx), which executes the downloaded package with full access to the agent's execution environment permissions. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles sensitive Figma Personal Access Tokens (
FIGMA_API_KEY) and writes design data to local cache directories (e.g.,~/Library/Caches/FigmaMcp). While these are necessary for the skill's function, they represent a surface for potential data exposure if the cache is compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted design data from Figma URLs, creating a surface for injection.
- Ingestion points: Figma API responses (design nodes, text, and styles) ingested via
get_figma_datainSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions within design data.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (
npx), file-system writes (download_figma_imagesto~/Downloadsand disk caching), and network access to the Figma API. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of design content before it is provided to the agent context.
Audit Metadata