ainovel-cli-vietnamese
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions require cloning source code from an unverified GitHub repository (
https://github.com/kentjuno/ainovel-cli.git) that does not belong to the skill author or a trusted organization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Users are guided to compile and execute the external source code using
go buildanddocker build, leading to the execution of unverified binaries on the host system or within a container. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for tool execution, including batch processing scripts that run locally and mount host directories into a Docker environment, granting the tool access to the local file system.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The multi-agent architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its core inputs.
- Ingestion points: User-provided novel prompts and the
custom_rules.mdfile in the workspace directory. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions to separate instructions from generated content.
- Capability inventory: The tool performs file system writes to the
workspace/directory, network requests to LLM providers (OpenRouter, Anthropic, Gemini, OpenAI), and execution of local CLI commands. - Sanitization: There are no documented mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping the user-provided prompts before they are processed by the agent orchestration loop.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The configuration examples involve the use of sensitive API keys (
OPENROUTER_API_KEY,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) which are passed via environment variables to the unverified external tool.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata