chronosforge-temporal-email-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download a pre-built binary from a personal GitHub Pages site and a personal GitHub repository.
- Evidence: Downloads from
https://randyfajar.github.io/inbox-watcher-cli/andhttps://github.com/randyfajar/inbox-watcher-cli/releases/latest/download/chronosforge-linux. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and examples for executing the downloaded binary, including the use of administrative privileges and shell subprocesses.
- Evidence:
sudo mv chronosforge /usr/local/bin/in the GitHub Actions example. Integration examples usesubprocess.run(Python) andexec(Node.js) to call the tool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external email messages.
- Ingestion points: Processes incoming emails and message bodies via the
chronosforge inbox watchandchronosforge extractcommands. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompt instructions to isolate external email content from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for local file access (config files), network operations (API/Webhooks), and command execution via integration scripts.
- Sanitization: While it uses regex patterns for code extraction, the
chronosforge inbox message <id> --rawcommand allows for the processing of unsanitized external content.
Audit Metadata