continues-cli-session-transfer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions encourage users to install and run a third-party package
continuesfrom NPM usingnpx continuesornpm install -g continues. This package is not from a verified organization or well-known service. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool's core functionality involves scanning and reading sensitive session data from multiple local directories, including
~/.claude/,~/.cursor/,~/.copilot/, and others across 16 different AI tools. These files typically contain conversation history, internal reasoning, and source code fragments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of various CLI tools (e.g.,
gemini,codex,cursor) and supports passing arbitrary flags or arguments to these tools via the--inand passthrough mechanisms. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements Indirect Prompt Injection by design. It extracts historical data from external files and injects it as a structured markdown document into a new AI agent session.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads session data from local files such as
.jsonl,.json, and SQLite databases (e.g.,~/.claude/projects/,~/.cursor/projects/). - Boundary markers: Uses standard Markdown headers like
## Contextand## Recent Messagesto separate injected content, but lacks instructions to the receiving agent to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The tool performs file reads across the home directory, writes markdown files, and executes shell commands to launch destination AI tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of the transferred content is mentioned; the skill prioritizes preserving the full context of the original session.
Audit Metadata