firepulse-multi-model-ai-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to clone a repository from an unverified external source:
https://github.com/vishalGitthub/cli-llm-mesh.git. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup process involves executing an unverified bootstrap script (
python bootstrap.py) immediately after downloading the repository content, which is a high-risk operation as the script's contents are not inspected. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several shell commands for installation and operation, including
pip installfor unknown dependencies andpython firepulse.pyfor credential management and interactive sessions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection because it orchestrates data from multiple external LLM providers and user-supplied queries without documented sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via command-line arguments (the
--queryflag) and via the responses fetched from third-party AI APIs (xAI, OpenRouter, Mistral, DeepSeek). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard malicious instructions embedded within the data retrieved from external APIs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read and write to the local file system (specifically the
~/.firepulsedirectory) and perform network requests to various external services. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, output escaping, or filtering of the content processed by the orchestrator.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata