hermes-agent-self-evolution
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses the local session history database at
~/.hermes/sessions.db. This database contains private user-agent interaction logs, which are used as evaluation data for the evolution pipeline. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
TestSuiteConstraintmechanism executes shell commands, such aspytest tests/ -q, to validate evolved code variants. This allows for arbitrary command execution within the local environment based on the output of the LLM-driven evolution process. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Execution traces, prompts, and code snippets are sent to external LLM API providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Together) to facilitate the optimization process. This involves sending local operational data to remote servers.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions require cloning a remote repository from GitHub (
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent-self-evolution.git) and installing it as a development package. While the repository belongs to a well-known AI research organization, it introduces external code dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from session histories and PR descriptions to evolve its own prompts.
- Ingestion points: Reads data from
~/.hermes/sessions.dband externalpr_urlcontexts inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided documentation snippets to separate instructions from data during evaluation.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
pytestinSKILL.mdand automated PR creation viacreate_evolution_pr. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the session data is shown before it is used to influence the evolution of prompts or code.
Audit Metadata