openclaw-rl-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
terminal_rollout.pycode snippet explicitly usessubprocess.run(command, shell=True)to execute commands generated by the AI model (agent_model.generate). This allows for arbitrary command execution if the model is prompted to perform malicious actions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By combining model generation with shell execution, the skill enables a remote code execution vector where the AI agent acts as the execution engine for commands influenced by user input or internal logic.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct users to clone and install code from a third-party repository (
github.com/Gen-Verse/OpenClaw-RL.git) which is not from a recognized or trusted organization. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
gui_rollout.pysnippet usespyautogui.screenshot()to capture the user's screen. While intended for a GUI agent, this capability could be used to capture and exfiltrate sensitive visual information if the model outputs are logged or sent to an external provider. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation encourages the use of environment variables for sensitive tokens like
WANDB_API_KEYandHF_TOKEN. While standard practice, the inclusion ofOPENCLAW_API_KEYin shell exports increases the risk of credential leakage if environment logs are captured.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata