openclaw-windows-companion

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and run executable installers directly from an external GitHub repository.
  • Evidence: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/latest/download/OpenClawCompanion-Setup-x64.exe" -OutFile "OpenClawCompanion-Setup-x64.exe" and subsequent execution in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill enables a "Node Mode" that allows an AI agent to execute arbitrary system commands via PowerShell or other shells on the host machine.
  • Evidence: The system.run command capability described in the Node Mode configuration and code examples in SKILL.md.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill grants the agent access to sensitive environmental data, including the ability to take screenshots and capture images from the camera, which can be sent back to the gateway.
  • Evidence: Documentation for screen.snapshot and camera.snap methods within the Node Mode section of SKILL.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests commands from an external WebSocket gateway to perform high-risk system operations.
  • Ingestion points: Messages received via the GatewayClient WebSocket connection processed in the EventHandler class in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation describes a user-configurable allowCommands whitelist in ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json to restrict agent capabilities.
  • Capability inventory: Remote command execution (system.run), screen capture, camera access, and WebView2 script execution (canvas.eval).
  • Sanitization: No specific evidence of input sanitization or validation for the agent-supplied command arguments is provided in the documentation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 14, 2026, 08:47 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — openclaw-windows-companion