openclaw-windows-companion
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and run executable installers directly from an external GitHub repository.
- Evidence:
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/latest/download/OpenClawCompanion-Setup-x64.exe" -OutFile "OpenClawCompanion-Setup-x64.exe"and subsequent execution inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill enables a "Node Mode" that allows an AI agent to execute arbitrary system commands via PowerShell or other shells on the host machine.
- Evidence: The
system.runcommand capability described in the Node Mode configuration and code examples inSKILL.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill grants the agent access to sensitive environmental data, including the ability to take screenshots and capture images from the camera, which can be sent back to the gateway.
- Evidence: Documentation for
screen.snapshotandcamera.snapmethods within the Node Mode section ofSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests commands from an external WebSocket gateway to perform high-risk system operations.
- Ingestion points: Messages received via the
GatewayClientWebSocket connection processed in theEventHandlerclass inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation describes a user-configurable
allowCommandswhitelist in~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonto restrict agent capabilities. - Capability inventory: Remote command execution (
system.run), screen capture, camera access, and WebView2 script execution (canvas.eval). - Sanitization: No specific evidence of input sanitization or validation for the agent-supplied command arguments is provided in the documentation.
Audit Metadata