runbookhermes-aiops-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone an external repository from a non-trusted source and install its dependencies.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/Tommy-yw/RunbookHermes.gitfollowed bypip install -r requirements.txtorpoetry install. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides instructions to execute shell commands for environment configuration and service deployment.
- Evidence: Commands include
docker-compose up -d,uvicorn apps.runbook_api.main:app, andpython -m apps.runbook_api.main. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted data from observability backends (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context from Prometheus, Loki, and Jaeger backends, as well as Alertmanager webhooks.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are documented for the ingested observability data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute sensitive operations such as
execute_rollback,create_checkpoint, andrequest_approval. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic applied to the external observability content before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata