skills/aradotso/marketing-skills/r16-voltagent-seo-content-marketing-agent-skills/Gen Agent Trust Hub
r16-voltagent-seo-content-marketing-agent-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub account (
Gravityaespot). Downloading and installing extensions or code from non-trusted third-party sources poses a risk as the code has not been audited for malicious behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation guide involves manual shell commands to copy third-party files into the agent's sensitive local configuration directory (
~/.claude/skills/). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks due to its core functionality of auditing external content.
- Ingestion points: Commands like
/content-audit,/technical-seo, and/competitor-gap(SKILL.md) ingest and process data directly from external URLs provided by the user or discovered during crawls. - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to prevent the agent from following malicious commands found on audited sites.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to perform network crawling and file-system operations (writing reports in various formats).
- Sanitization: The instructions do not describe any sanitization or validation of the external content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata