cheatengine-mcp-bridge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides tools for arbitrary code execution within the host system and target processes, including
execute_codefor shellcode,inject_dllfor library injection, andauto_assemblefor script execution via Cheat Engine. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
create_processtool allows the AI agent to launch arbitrary executables on the system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: High-risk memory reading tools such as
read_memory,read_pointer_chain, anddissect_structureallow access to the entire memory space of target processes, potentially exposing sensitive information like session tokens, keys, or personal data. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill encourages the use of DBVM, a Ring -1 kernel hypervisor, for 'invisible debugging' and memory access, which grants the agent extremely high-level system privileges.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). An attacker can place malicious instructions in the memory of a process being analyzed (e.g., in a string field). When the agent reads this memory using
read_stringordisassemble, it could ingest instructions that trigger its RCE capabilities (inject_dll,execute_code). - Ingestion points:
read_string,read_memory,disassemble,get_rtti_classnameinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None specified in instructions.
- Capability inventory:
execute_code,inject_dll,auto_assemble,write_memory(defined as MCP tools). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of memory content is described before processing by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation instructions include standard Python dependencies
mcpandpywin32from public registries. - [SAFE]: The use of Windows Named Pipes for local inter-process communication between the Python MCP server and the Cheat Engine Lua bridge is a standard and expected mechanism for this type of integration.
Audit Metadata