claude-tradingview-mcp-autotrading

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent and the user to download the primary application code from an external GitHub repository (jackson-video-resources/claude-tradingview-mcp-trading) that is not identified as a trusted source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to execute several shell commands, including cloning external repositories, installing Node.js dependencies (npm install), and running execution scripts (node bot.js). It also includes a node -e command for executing dynamic JavaScript strings to test API connectivity.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive financial credentials, specifically BitGet API keys, secrets, and passphrases. It guides the user to store these in a .env file, which is a common but high-risk practice for automated trading systems.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its strategy extraction workflow.
  • Ingestion points: The prompts/01-extract-strategy.md file processes untrusted YouTube transcript data from an external scraper (Apify).
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested transcript content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including file system writes (fs.appendFileSync), network access for trade execution via the ccxt library, and subprocess execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the transcript content is performed before it is processed by the agent to generate the rules.json file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 15, 2026, 01:04 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-tradingview-mcp-autotrading