claude-tradingview-mcp-autotrading
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent and the user to download the primary application code from an external GitHub repository (
jackson-video-resources/claude-tradingview-mcp-trading) that is not identified as a trusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to execute several shell commands, including cloning external repositories, installing Node.js dependencies (
npm install), and running execution scripts (node bot.js). It also includes anode -ecommand for executing dynamic JavaScript strings to test API connectivity. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive financial credentials, specifically BitGet API keys, secrets, and passphrases. It guides the user to store these in a
.envfile, which is a common but high-risk practice for automated trading systems. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its strategy extraction workflow.
- Ingestion points: The
prompts/01-extract-strategy.mdfile processes untrusted YouTube transcript data from an external scraper (Apify). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested transcript content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including file system writes (
fs.appendFileSync), network access for trade execution via theccxtlibrary, and subprocess execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the transcript content is performed before it is processed by the agent to generate the
rules.jsonfile.
Audit Metadata