cocos-creator-mcp-server
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct the user to clone a repository from GitHub (
DaxianLee/cocos-mcp-server). This introduces an external dependency on code from a source outside of the primary vendor or trusted organization list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents several shell commands for installation and troubleshooting, including
git clone,netstat, andcurl. These are used for setup and verifying local connectivity to the MCP server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing data from the external Cocos Creator environment.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
node_queryandasset_queryretrieve node names and metadata, whiledebug_consolereads console logs which could contain attacker-controlled content. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or delimiters to differentiate between retrieved data and agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides high-privilege capabilities including project building and execution (
project_manage), file deletion (asset_operations), and scene modification (node_lifecycle). - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization steps are documented for the data retrieved from the editor before it is returned to the agent context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes local network communication (
http://127.0.0.1:3000) for its transport mechanism. This address is whitelisted and aligns with the expected architecture for a local MCP server.
Audit Metadata