godot-mcp-native
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The tools
execute-scriptandevaluate-runtime-expressionallow the agent to execute arbitrary GDScript strings. This provides full access to Godot's internal APIs, which include capabilities for filesystem manipulation and system command execution through theOSsingleton. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The manual installation instructions direct users to clone source code from an external repository at
github.com/yurineko73/Godot-MCP-Native.git, which is outside the authoritative scope of the skill's primary author context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a large suite of tools to modify the local development environment, including
modify-script,create-script, anddelete-node, which allow for persistent changes to the project's codebase and structure. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Tools like
read-script,get-editor-logs, andget-editor-screenshotenable the retrieval of potentially sensitive project source code, debug logs, and visual workspace data, which is then transmitted to the agent context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from project files and logs, which could contain instructions that influence the agent's behavior when utilizing its high-privilege execution tools.
- Ingestion points:
read-script,get-editor-logs,get-scene-tree, andget-debug-stack-variablesinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the tool descriptions to differentiate between project data and agent instructions.
- Capability inventory:
execute-script,evaluate-runtime-expression,modify-script,run-project, anddelete-nodeinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No evidence of data validation or sanitization before external content is processed by the agent.
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