nanobanana-mcp-image-generation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct users to run uvx nanobanana-mcp-server@latest. This command downloads and executes the latest version of a package from a remote registry at runtime without integrity checks or version pinning.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the nanobanana-mcp-server package, which is hosted in a repository (github.com/zhongweili/nanobanana-mcp-server) belonging to an untrusted individual rather than a recognized organization. Running this code via uvx grants it execution privileges on the user's system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The upload_file tool enables the agent to read local files from the filesystem and upload them to the Google Gemini Files API. While intended for image reference, this capability creates a significant surface for exfiltrating sensitive local data if the agent's logic is manipulated.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process requires manual execution of shell commands and configuration of MCP client JSON files, involving the handling of sensitive environment variables such as GEMINI_API_KEY and GCP_PROJECT_ID.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user prompts to drive image generation and editing. Because the skill has the combined capability to read files (upload_file), write files (generate_image via output_path), and perform network operations, it is susceptible to multi-step injection attacks aimed at unauthorized file access or data leakage.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 04:38 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — nanobanana-mcp-image-generation