zabbix-mcp-server
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions guide the user to execute
uvxwith a remote GitHub repository (mpeirone/zabbix-mcp-server). This pattern downloads and runs unverified external code on the user's system at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on fetching code from an external, non-authoritative repository during installation and execution, creating a dependency on third-party code that has not been audited.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool
zabbix_apiprovides the agent with the ability to execute any method on the Zabbix API. Without user-configured restrictions such asREAD_ONLY,ZABBIX_API_WHITELIST, orZABBIX_API_BLACKLIST, the agent can perform destructive actions like deleting hosts, items, or triggers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through data retrieved from the Zabbix API. \n
- Ingestion points: Data fields like host names, problem descriptions, and trigger expressions retrieved via the
zabbix_apitool. \n - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat API responses as untrusted data. \n
- Capability inventory: The
zabbix_apitool allows for creating and modifying Zabbix resources, providing an attacker with a way to influence the monitoring environment if they can inject instructions into the monitoring data. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the Zabbix API output before it is processed by the AI agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata