esaa-security-audit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub user (
github.com/elzobrito/ESAA-Security.git) which is not identified as a trusted vendor.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves cloning a remote repository and installing dependencies viapip install, followed by the execution of Python scripts from that repository. This allows for the execution of arbitrary remote code from an untrusted source.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires sensitive LLM API keys to be set as environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY). Because the skill executes unverified code from an external source, there is a significant risk that these credentials could be exfiltrated.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides examples of shell commands for setup and execution (e.g.,git clone,pip install,python orchestrator.py) which facilitate the operation of code originating from an untrusted source.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from an external repository. 1. Ingestion points: Source code files read from the path defined inAUDIT_TARGET_REPO. 2. Boundary markers: The skill mentions using schema-validated outputs andAGENT_CONTRACT.yamlfor governance. 3. Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to read various file types (**/*.py,**/*.js, etc.) and write findings to the reports directory. 4. Sanitization: While the skill mentions hallucination prevention, it lacks explicit details on the sanitization or escaping of ingested code content before processing by the LLM.
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