gandalf-llm-pentester
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installation instructions recommend cloning a repository from an unverified GitHub user (
MrMoshkovitz) and running code via a Google Colab notebook, which involves executing logic from non-official sources. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches several standard dependencies including
anthropic,requests, andjupyterfrom the Python Package Index. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains numerous examples of attack vectors like "Ignore previous instructions" and "System override", which are intended payloads for testing external model security as part of the Gandalf challenge.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides documentation for shell commands to set up the environment, including
git clone,pip install, and environment variable configuration. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Communicates with the Lakera Gandalf API and the Anthropic Claude API to execute and analyze security tests.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted output from the Gandalf LLM and interpolates it into validation prompts for the Claude API, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
responsesdata in thevalidate_level_successfunction, sourced from the Gandalf API. - Boundary markers: None identified; external responses are serialized as JSON and embedded directly into the instructions for the analyzer model.
- Capability inventory: The skill has network capabilities via the
requestslibrary and the Anthropic SDK. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the content received from the external API is implemented before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata