gandalf-llm-pentester

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installation instructions recommend cloning a repository from an unverified GitHub user (MrMoshkovitz) and running code via a Google Colab notebook, which involves executing logic from non-official sources.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches several standard dependencies including anthropic, requests, and jupyter from the Python Package Index.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains numerous examples of attack vectors like "Ignore previous instructions" and "System override", which are intended payloads for testing external model security as part of the Gandalf challenge.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides documentation for shell commands to set up the environment, including git clone, pip install, and environment variable configuration.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Communicates with the Lakera Gandalf API and the Anthropic Claude API to execute and analyze security tests.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted output from the Gandalf LLM and interpolates it into validation prompts for the Claude API, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The responses data in the validate_level_success function, sourced from the Gandalf API.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; external responses are serialized as JSON and embedded directly into the instructions for the analyzer model.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has network capabilities via the requests library and the Anthropic SDK.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the content received from the external API is implemented before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 12, 2026, 08:51 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gandalf-llm-pentester