pentest-r1-autonomous-penetration-testing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones a repository from an unverified source:
https://github.com/KHenryAegis/Pentest-R1.git. It also installs a specific git commit of theunslothlibrary directly from GitHub. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several Python scripts such as
grpo_stage1.pyandgrpo_multi_turn_stage2.py, along with shell commands to build and run Docker containers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
CTFEnvironmentclass utilizescontainer.exec_run(command)to execute shell commands. In theevaluate_on_ctf_challengesloop, these commands are generated dynamically by the LLM based on environment observations, which allows for the execution of arbitrary model-generated code. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The recommended Docker configuration uses the
--net=hostflag. This grants the container full access to the host machine's network stack, which could be exploited by the model to interact with local network services or exfiltrate data from the host environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an autonomous loop that is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the context via
env.execute_command("cat /challenge/description.txt")within theevaluate_on_ctf_challengesfunction inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The
_build_promptmethod lacks delimiters or instructions to isolate untrusted observation data from the system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses shell execution capabilities via
container.exec_runin theCTFEnvironmentclass. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of command validation or sanitization before the LLM-generated strings are executed in the shell.
Audit Metadata