pentestcompanion-workspace

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Jun 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.90). The prompt includes multiple examples that embed API keys, bearer tokens, webhook URLs, and other secrets directly into curl commands, shell functions, and config files (e.g., PCLOG_TOKEN, Authorization: Bearer pcsk_your_token, SMTP_PASSWORD, RESEND_API_KEY), which would require the LLM to place secret values verbatim into generated commands/code, creating an exfiltration risk.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

  • Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The installation steps explicitly run "git clone https://github.com/Poellie01/PentestCompanion.git" followed by executing the fetched code (python app.py / docker compose up), so the GitHub URL is a runtime external dependency that results in executing remote code.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.70). The prompt includes explicit instructions that weaken security controls (e.g., telling users to set SSRF_BLOCK_PRIVATE=false to allow private IP access) and encourages running system-altering commands (docker compose up/down, docker exec, flask db upgrade) which collectively push the agent to bypass protections and modify host/container state.

Issues (3)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

W012
MEDIUM

Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 12, 2026, 08:51 PM
Issues
3
Security Audit — snyk — pentestcompanion-workspace