wxmini-security-audit

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download a binary executable (unveilr.exe) from a non-trusted third-party GitHub repository (github.com/nicholaschan23/unveilr).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The framework directs the user to fetch and run external code and binaries from untrusted sources, which could lead to arbitrary code execution if the source is compromised or malicious.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture (Phase 1) is designed to execute the unveilr.exe binary locally to decompile WeChat mini-program files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes untrusted code from external mini-programs. The agent roles (e.g., SecretScanner, VulnAnalyzer) lack boundary markers or instructions to disregard malicious commands embedded within the analyzed files.
  • Ingestion points: Reads all .js, .json, and .xml files from the target mini-program directory.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The agents process raw extraction results without explicit delimiters or safety instructions to ignore content acting as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute local Python scripts and an external binary (unveilr.exe), and writes numerous report files to the local system.
  • Sanitization: None detected. Content is extracted via regex and passed directly to LLM agents for analysis.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 17, 2026, 03:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wxmini-security-audit