clone-hook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automates the discovery and upload of user media files to external cloud storage services.
- Evidence: It uses the command
find ~/Downloads ~/Desktop -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -iname "*.mp4" -o -iname "*.mov" -o -iname "*.webm" \) -mmin -15to locate recently saved media files. - Evidence: Discovered files are transmitted to a remote S3 bucket via
curl -X PUTusing presigned URLs generated by vendor-specific tools. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted media content and uses the resulting analysis to drive subsequent video generation tools.
- Ingestion points: Video and media analysis output generated by the
arcads_analyze_mediatool (SKILL.md Step 2). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or safety warnings to the model to ignore potential malicious instructions embedded within the analyzed media text.
- Capability inventory: Local file system access (find, mkdir), network operations (curl), and powerful media generation capabilities (Seedance 2.0).
- Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization or validation is performed on the text generated from media analysis before it is interpolated into generation prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for environment setup and data management.
- Evidence: Shell execution includes
mkdir -pfor session organization,findfor asset discovery, andcurlfor both uploading assets and downloading generated results.
Audit Metadata