pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from GitHub pull requests, which serves as a vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent ingests untrusted data from
gh pr diff, PR descriptions, and PR review comments usinggh pr view --commentsand GitHub API calls (/pulls/<n>/commentsand/pulls/<n>/reviews). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of boundary markers or clear delimiters to isolate untrusted PR content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities, including the ability to write PR comments (
gh pr comment), modify the repository by committing and pushing fixes (git push), and execute arbitrary scripts defined in the repository's profile. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands to manage the git environment and interact with the GitHub CLI.
- Evidence: The skill uses
git fetch,git worktree add,gh pr update-branch, andgh apito manage PR state and metadata. - Environment setup: The skill suggests installing tools via shell commands (e.g.,
apt install gh -y) if they are missing. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes code provided in the pull request as part of its verification process.
- Execution mechanism: By checking out the PR branch using
git worktreeand running the<pre_merge_entry>script (which may triggernpm testor other build tools), the agent executes code that has been modified by an external contributor. While this is the intended primary purpose of a PR review agent, it remains a mechanism for executing unverified code within the agent's environment.
Audit Metadata