setup-routines
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple arbitrary shell commands defined in the repository's
.claude/routines/catalog.jsonfile. This includes fields such aslocal.command,presenceRegister,envSetupScript, andsingletonProbe. It also modifies the systemcrontabto create durable persistence for these commands by writing a marker block to the user's crontab file. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions direct the agent to extract sensitive credentials, specifically
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKENandGH_TOKEN(extracted viagh auth token), and store them in a persistent local file at~/.<slug>-routines/env. While it specifiesmode 600, storing plaintext tokens in a file for automated access is a significant security risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes repository-provided installation commands and runs scripts within a dedicated worktree or clone. This allows the repository to execute arbitrary code on the runner's machine during the setup phase or during scheduled routine execution.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses the
RemoteTriggertool to create cloud-based automation that sends rendered prompt templates and repository data to an external platform. This effectively schedules the transmission of repository contents to a remote service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted repository data.
- Ingestion points: Reads configuration and prompt templates from
.claude/routines/catalog.jsonand.claude/routines/templates/*.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate ingested template content from agent instructions during interpolation.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell execution (
Bash), file system modification, and cloud trigger management (RemoteTrigger). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the ingested repository content before it is executed as a command or rendered into cloud triggers.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata