morning-briefing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface where instructions embedded in processed data could influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads state files from
~/.openclaw/skill-state/belonging to other skills (daily-review,long-running-task-management,task-handoff), as defined inSKILL.mdand implemented inrun.py. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers, delimiters, or 'ignore instructions' warnings are used when interpolating this external data into the briefing output in the
format_briefingfunction withinrun.py. - Capability inventory: The skill performs local file reads (
load_state) and writes (save_own_state) to manage its state, and outputs the briefing text to standard output for the agent to process. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content retrieved from the source state files before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata