workspace-integrity-guardian
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill monitors and processes workspace files like SOUL.md and MEMORY.md that can be modified by external entities, creating an attack surface where malicious instructions in these files could influence the agent during drift review.\n
- Ingestion points: The
guard.pyscript reads the contents ofSOUL.md,AGENTS.md,MEMORY.md, andIDENTITY.mdin thecmd_baseline,cmd_check, andcmd_acceptfunctions.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the monitored files when reviewing drift.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to workspace files using the
cmd_restorefunction inguard.py.\n - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or validation of the content read from the monitored files before it is presented to the agent.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill stores the full, Base64-encoded content of sensitive agent identity files in a local state file, which could contain secrets or private configurations.\n
- Evidence:
guard.pystores file contents in thebaseline_contentfield of the state object withinSTATE_FILE.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill uses the platform's native cron scheduling to run periodically, ensuring its logic persists across agent sessions.\n - Evidence:
cron: "0 3 * * 0"in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements its logic via a standalone Python script that the agent is instructed to execute with varying arguments, requiring shell execution capabilities.\n - Evidence: The usage of
python3 guard.pyfor operations like checking drift, restoring files, and adding new files to monitoring.
Audit Metadata