using-loopkit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong imperative language and explicit override commands to direct agent behavior.
- Evidence: "EXTREMELY-IMPORTANT", "YOU MUST USE IT", and "This overrides 'just answer quickly' instincts. Not negotiable."
- While intended to enforce a development workflow, these patterns are similar to techniques used to bypass standard agent response characteristics.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface by instructing the agent to load and execute instructions from a directory of external files.
- Ingestion points: The agent is directed to read
.claude/skills/<name>/SKILL.mdbased on trigger phrases found in the content it processes. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide delimiters or warnings to treat the content of these external files as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to "follow the skill exactly," granting the logic within those external files significant influence over agent actions.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the content of the loaded skill files.
Audit Metadata