style-package-generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input files (PPTX, images, text) to generate style packages containing natural language instructions for downstream AI models, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from user-provided .pptx files via
scripts/extract_pptx_style.py, images through the image-pipeline described inreferences/image-pipeline.md, and various markdown or text documents.\n - Boundary markers: It implements strong boundary controls by using a dedicated validation script
scripts/validate_style_package.pythat enforces a script-free, self-containedpreview.htmland validates all metadata against a fixed schema.\n - Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local file system using
scripts/write_style_package.pyand execute subprocesses viascripts/capture_preview_webp.py.\n - Sanitization: Sanitization is handled by XXE (XML External Entity) protection in the PPTX parser, HTML escaping for content nodes in
assets/preview.html.template, and magic bytes validation for image inputs.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries to render style previews and convert images.\n - Evidence: The script
scripts/capture_preview_webp.pyusessubprocess.runto execute system browser binaries (Chrome, Chromium, or Edge) and thecwebputility.\n - Context: These executions are restricted to rendering AI-generated preview HTML which is strictly validated for safety before execution. Commands are constructed as argument lists without using a shell environment, mitigating shell injection risks.
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