argos-pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to read authentication tokens from the local configuration file located at
~/.config/argos-ci/config.json. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the
argosCLI, such asargos build getandargos build review, using authentication tokens passed as environment variables or command-line flags. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill ingests and displays external image URLs (e.g.,
head.url,base.url) from the Argos API, which represents a potential vector for out-of-band data exfiltration if the source data is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted information from pull request titles, descriptions, and commit messages to determine its review logic. * Ingestion points: Pull request title, description, branch names, commit messages, and metadata fields in
SKILL.md. * Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested data. * Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via theargosCLI. * Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the untrusted input before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata