daily-qa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from various external sources including CI logs, git commit diffs, and dependency manifest outputs to generate reports and suggested fixes. This creates an attack surface where a malicious actor could embed prompt injection instructions within a commit message or a simulated CI failure log to influence the agent's behavior during the QA process.
- Ingestion points: Git commit history (
git log), GitHub Action logs (gh run view), and dependency update metadata (npm/pip/cargo outdated). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit technical delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the logs, though they do mandate that all findings be grounded in concrete evidence.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for shell execution,WebFetchfor network access, and the ability to write files to the repository (reports and.gitignore). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of ingested log content is mentioned.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute various repository management and interrogation commands, includinggit,gh,npm,pip,pnpm, andcargo. While these are used for their intended QA purposes, they represent a significant execution capability within the repository environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is authorized to use
WebFetchto retrieve external data, specifically identified for fetching upstream changelogs and dependency information to assess 'SDK drift'.
Audit Metadata