validating-setup-commands

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the CLAUDE.md file located in the repository root.
  • Ingestion points: The script reads the content of CLAUDE.md (via grep and sed) to extract setup commands.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the processed file.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is designed to return extracted strings (INSTALL_CMD, POSTINSTALL_CMD) which are intended to be executed directly in a shell by the caller.
  • Sanitization: There is no validation, filtering, or escaping of the extracted commands. Any arbitrary command placed inside backticks in the ### Setup section of CLAUDE.md will be extracted and potentially executed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands sourced from documentation. The 'Integration Pattern' section demonstrates that extracted values are intended for direct shell execution (e.g., $INSTALL_CMD). A malicious project could include harmful commands (e.g., data exfiltration or file deletion) in its CLAUDE.md that would be triggered during the automated setup process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 03:41 PM