validating-setup-commands
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the
CLAUDE.mdfile located in the repository root. - Ingestion points: The script reads the content of
CLAUDE.md(viagrepandsed) to extract setup commands. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the processed file.
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to return extracted strings (
INSTALL_CMD,POSTINSTALL_CMD) which are intended to be executed directly in a shell by the caller. - Sanitization: There is no validation, filtering, or escaping of the extracted commands. Any arbitrary command placed inside backticks in the
### Setupsection ofCLAUDE.mdwill be extracted and potentially executed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands sourced from documentation. The 'Integration Pattern' section demonstrates that extracted values are intended for direct shell execution (e.g.,
$INSTALL_CMD). A malicious project could include harmful commands (e.g., data exfiltration or file deletion) in itsCLAUDE.mdthat would be triggered during the automated setup process.
Audit Metadata