arize-evaluator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it defines workflows for evaluating external, untrusted data using LLM-as-judge prompts.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from trace spans and experiment runs using commands such as
ax spans exportandax experiments export(see SKILL.md, Workflow A Step 6 and Workflow B Step 5). - Boundary markers: The provided template examples use simple
{variable}interpolation (e.g.,{input},{output},{context}) without delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potential instructions embedded within that data (see SKILL.md, Best Practices for Template Design). - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
ax tasks trigger-runcommand to send these interpolated prompts to various LLM provider integrations for execution and scoring. - Sanitization: There are no instructions or built-in mechanisms described for sanitizing or validating the content of the spans before they are processed by the judge model.
Audit Metadata