phoenix-harbor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the
arize-phoenix-clientPython package. This is a legitimate library from the vendor (Arize AI) used for the intended purpose of the skill. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill mentions the use of
PHOENIX_API_KEYbut correctly advises users to set this via environment variables rather than hardcoding it, preventing the key from being stored in shell history or configuration files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an attack surface by ingesting external data from Harbor tasks, ATIF trajectories, and JSON reference files.
- Ingestion points: Harbor task metadata (
task.toml), ATIF trajectory files, and user-defined JSON reference files. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define LLM boundary markers as it primarily handles data mapping for an observability plugin.
- Capability inventory: The plugin reads files and performs network operations to the Phoenix collector endpoint (
PHOENIX_COLLECTOR_ENDPOINT). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly implements path traversal mitigation by rejecting absolute paths, parent directory components (
..), and symlinks that escape the task root folder. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A static hint regarding concealment was evaluated and found to be a false positive. The skill actually encourages transparency by instructing the agent not to suppress error facts and ensuring users are notified of record conflicts.
Audit Metadata