phoenix-harbor

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install the arize-phoenix-client Python package. This is a legitimate library from the vendor (Arize AI) used for the intended purpose of the skill.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill mentions the use of PHOENIX_API_KEY but correctly advises users to set this via environment variables rather than hardcoding it, preventing the key from being stored in shell history or configuration files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an attack surface by ingesting external data from Harbor tasks, ATIF trajectories, and JSON reference files.
  • Ingestion points: Harbor task metadata (task.toml), ATIF trajectory files, and user-defined JSON reference files.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define LLM boundary markers as it primarily handles data mapping for an observability plugin.
  • Capability inventory: The plugin reads files and performs network operations to the Phoenix collector endpoint (PHOENIX_COLLECTOR_ENDPOINT).
  • Sanitization: The skill explicitly implements path traversal mitigation by rejecting absolute paths, parent directory components (..), and symlinks that escape the task root folder.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A static hint regarding concealment was evaluated and found to be a false positive. The skill actually encourages transparency by instructing the agent not to suppress error facts and ensuring users are notified of record conflicts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 2, 2026, 02:19 AM