skf-update-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's 'On Activation' sequence executes arbitrary commands defined in the
workflow.activation_steps_prependandworkflow.activation_steps_appendarrays within theconfig.yamlfile. This allows for runtime execution of logic defined in persistent configuration. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
on_completehook incustomize.tomlallows the execution of arbitrary commands after the reporting stage is finished. The command is invoked with a result path argument and executed in a subprocess. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/skf-new-file-diff.pyusesimportlib.utilto dynamically load and execute an external Python module (skf-classify-changed-files.py) from a calculated path. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from source code and authoritative documentation files (e.g.,
llms.txt,AGENTS.md) to update skill instructions. While it uses AST-based structural analysis to minimize risk, it remains susceptible to malicious instructions embedded in the processed files that might influence the agent's behavior during the update workflow. - Ingestion points:
references/re-extract.md(source code parsing) andreferences/detect-changes.md(authoritative file discovery). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit, robust delimiters or 'ignore' warnings for the content being extracted into the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the filesystem using
Write/Edittools and execute local scripts viauv run. - Sanitization: Relies on specific AST recipes to filter and structure content, providing a degree of separation between raw input and agent instructions.
Audit Metadata