gtm-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and execute a shell script from an external URL by piping it directly into bash.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://api.gtm-tools.sh/extension/install.sh | bashinSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads executable content from a non-whitelisted domain to install an extension.
- Evidence:
https://api.gtm-tools.sh/extension/install.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell-based tool invocations and CLI commands for setup and operation.
- Evidence: Multiple
curlcommands for authentication and tool execution, plusgtm-tools admin loginfor CLI authentication. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages and transmits sensitive data, including API keys and user interaction data, to an external API service.
- Evidence: Instructions for handling
GTM_TOOLS_API_KEYand calls toapi.gtm-tools.shfor identity registration and data retrieval. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources (LinkedIn and Reddit) that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Tools such as
get_linkedin_post,get_reddit_post, andlist_user_postsinreferences/tools.mdretrieve external content. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are present in the provided documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including shell execution (
curl,bash) and file system access (~/.gtm-tools/config.json). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are described for processing external post content.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://api.gtm-tools.sh/extension/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata