brandkit-publish
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/ai_label.pyto callexiftoolfor writing IPTC metadata to images. This execution is performed using a list of arguments and does not invoke a shell, mitigating command injection risks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdinstructions guide the agent to executechrome --headlessfor PDF generation andhiggsfieldfor image creation. These are standard operations for the intended use case of publishing branded assets. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from a file named
BRAND.mdto determine design constraints and text patterns. - Ingestion points:
BRAND.mdfile content is read and interpreted by the agent (mentioned inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The agent is instructed to follow
BRAND.mdas the primary authority. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocess(inscripts/ai_label.py), perform network requests (implied by image generation tools), and write files to the local system. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the instructions found within
BRAND.mdis specified, creating a surface where a malicious brand kit could influence agent behavior.
Audit Metadata