marketing-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation and roadmap files (README.md, MARKETING-EXECUTION-PLAN.md) recommend installing agent skills and dependencies from an untrusted third-party GitHub repository (
alirezarezvani/claude-skills). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
prompt-engineer-toolkit/scripts/prompt_tester.pyuses thesubprocess.run()function to execute shell commands. These commands are generated from a template provided by the user via the--runner-cmdargument, allowing for the execution of arbitrary system commands. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
prompt_tester.pytool dynamically assembles command-line strings using Python's.format()method to inject prompt and input data into a runner command. This capability is used to execute external LLM CLI tools but creates a vector for code or command injection if inputs are not strictly controlled. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Multiple scripts ingest untrusted data from external files, most notably
prompt_tester.pywhich readstestcases.json. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands in the processed content.
- Capability inventory: The toolkit includes
subprocess.run(command execution) andurllib.request.urlopen(network access for auditing URLs and sitemaps), which can be exploited if an attacker influences the data being processed. - Sanitization: Although
shlex.splitis used inprompt_tester.py, it does not sanitize the contents of user-supplied variables before they are formatted into the execution string.
Audit Metadata