promote
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow for reading potentially untrusted data from a memory file (
MEMORY.md) and writing it to critical configuration files (CLAUDE.md). This creates a vulnerability surface where a user could potentially inject instructions into the agent's memory that are later 'promoted' to permanent rules. - Ingestion points:
MEMORY.md(Step 2 and 6). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters to separate promoted content from the rest of the rule file.
- Capability inventory: File system write access to project rule files (Step 5).
- Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization is performed, though the skill instructions require the agent to 'distill' the notes into instructions, providing a manual cognitive filter.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include shell commands like
grep,sed, andpwdused to locate and search the agent's internal memory storage. These commands are used for local path resolution and do not pose a risk of arbitrary code execution.
Audit Metadata