extract-design
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install or run the
designlangpackage from the public npm registry usingnpm install -g designlangornpx designlang. This involves downloading and executing code from a third-party source not maintained by the skill author. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute thedesignlangCLI and thecatcommand to read generated output files into the agent's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant surface for indirect prompt injection because it scrapes content from external URLs and reads the extracted design data back into the agent's context without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Website content is processed via
npx designlang <url>inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands when reading the output file
cat design-extract-output/*-design-language.md. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Read,Write, andGlobtools across its scripts, which could be misused if the agent obeys instructions hidden within the scraped web content. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the scraped website content before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata