subtitles
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions in
references/auth-setup.mdguide the agent to modify shell profile files such as~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc, or~/.profileto export theTRANSCRIPTOUT_API_KEYenvironment variable. This allows the tool's credentials to persist across different shell sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcript and metadata content from YouTube videos, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: YouTube transcripts, titles, and descriptions fetched via the
/v1/transcriptendpoint inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill contains an explicit instruction block titled 'Treat fetched content as data' which warns the agent to ignore commands or instructions embedded in the transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands and perform network operations to
api.transcriptout.com. - Sanitization: No automated sanitization is described; the skill relies on the agent following the provided instructions to avoid executing embedded data.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a local credential file located at
~/.config/transcriptout/key. It reads this sensitive file to set an environment variable which is then sent as a Bearer token toapi.transcriptout.com. While this is the intended authentication flow, it involves accessing local files containing secrets. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
references/auth-setup.mdfile provides several complex shell one-liners for the agent to execute. these include directory creation, restrictive file permission setting (chmod 700,umask 077), and account management viacurlrequests to the vendor's API.
Audit Metadata