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Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions in references/auth-setup.md guide the agent to modify shell profile files such as ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, or ~/.profile to export the TRANSCRIPTOUT_API_KEY environment variable. This allows the tool's credentials to persist across different shell sessions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcript and metadata content from YouTube videos, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: YouTube transcripts, titles, and descriptions fetched via the /v1/transcript endpoint in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill contains an explicit instruction block titled 'Treat fetched content as data' which warns the agent to ignore commands or instructions embedded in the transcripts.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands and perform network operations to api.transcriptout.com.
  • Sanitization: No automated sanitization is described; the skill relies on the agent following the provided instructions to avoid executing embedded data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a local credential file located at ~/.config/transcriptout/key. It reads this sensitive file to set an environment variable which is then sent as a Bearer token to api.transcriptout.com. While this is the intended authentication flow, it involves accessing local files containing secrets.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The references/auth-setup.md file provides several complex shell one-liners for the agent to execute. these include directory creation, restrictive file permission setting (chmod 700, umask 077), and account management via curl requests to the vendor's API.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 5, 2026, 11:10 PM