translation-coordinator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from external String Catalog files (.xcstrings) and user-provided terminology or style instructions, which are then used to generate prompts for sub-agents. If these external sources contain malicious instructions, they could be executed by the sub-agents during the translation process.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the StringCatalogRead tool, which retrieves keys and strings from project files, and through the user's provided "terminology and style choices."
  • Boundary markers: The delegation prompt template uses code blocks for keys but lacks robust delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers to isolate the content of the translations and style guidance from the sub-agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can modify project configurations using LocalizationPlanner and invokes the xcode-skills:translation skill in sub-agents, which typically involves file-writing capabilities.
  • Sanitization: The skill is explicitly instructed to forward string keys and user guidance "exactly" or "verbatim" as received, without sanitizing or filtering for potential embedded prompt injection payloads.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 07:50 PM