stick-figure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on a 'kit' directory located outside its own folder structure. Instructions in
SKILL.mdand logic inengine/make.shexecutebash "$KIT/setup.sh" --voiceto download and install approximately 1 GB of voice models. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow is orchestrated through shell scripts and Python tools that invoke multiple subprocesses, including
ffmpegfor media processing andnodefor rendering. The rendering toolengine/tools/render.jsutilizes Playwright to launch Chromium with the--allow-file-access-from-filesflag, which is used to load local web assets for frame synthesis. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The text-to-speech utility
engine/tools/tts_elevenlabs.pyis designed to read theELEVENLABS_API_KEYfrom the environment or a local.envfile. While this is a standard practice for managing secrets in developer tools, it indicates that the skill processes sensitive authentication credentials. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided topics or questions to generate animated scripts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, as the generated text influences the behavior of the audio and animation pipeline. Ingestion points: User input topics defined in
SKILL.md. Boundary markers: Not explicitly present in the provided scripts. Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (ffmpeg, node) and network requests to ElevenLabs. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the generated script content is observed in the provided files.
Audit Metadata