zach-d-films
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions depend on a directory structure external to the skill itself, executing setup scripts (e.g.,
bash "$KIT/setup.sh") and referencing tools from sibling skill folders (e.g.,../stick-figure/engine/tools/tts_kokoro.py). The setup script is indicated to download large assets (approximately 1 GB) for voice models and dependencies like Chromium. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive shell command execution for its primary workflow, including project filesystem management (
cp,ln,mkdir), rendering control via Node.js/Playwright, and media assembly usingffmpegandpython3subprocesses. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied narrative scripts to generate video content. This untrusted input is used for caption generation and text-to-speech. While the rendering pipeline uses safe update methods (such as
textContentin the DOM) to prevent script execution within the rendering browser, the ingestion of arbitrary text combined with the skill's extensive local execution capabilities represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: User-provided script content written to
script.jsonand interpolated intoCAPTIONSinshots.jsviacaptions.py. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined to ignore embedded instructions in the script data.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of
ffmpeg,node, andpython3for media processing and rendering; filesystem operations for project setup. - Sanitization:
captions.pyescapes single quotes for JavaScript string literals, and the frontend rendering engine inmain.jsutilizestextContentfor caption display, preventing DOM-based injection.
Audit Metadata