notebooklm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
README.mdandSKILL.mdfiles include specific, high-priority instructions directed at the AI agent (e.g., "Do exactly this, nothing more") designed to override the agent's normal reasoning process and force immediate execution of installation scripts. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/bootstrap.shscript executes a remote installation script for theuvtool fromastral.shusing acurl | shpipeline. While originating from a well-known service, this pattern executes unverified code in the user's shell environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading and installing multiple third-party packages and binaries, including
notebooklm-mcp-cli,notebooklm-py, and the Chromium browser via Playwright, expanding the local attack surface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on shell command execution via Bash scripts and Python's
subprocessmodule to manage external CLI tools and environment configurations. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages and references sensitive authentication data, specifically Google account session cookies stored in
~/.notebooklm, which are required for the tool's core functionality but represent a sensitive data management responsibility.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata