notebooklm

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The README.md and SKILL.md files include specific, high-priority instructions directed at the AI agent (e.g., "Do exactly this, nothing more") designed to override the agent's normal reasoning process and force immediate execution of installation scripts.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/bootstrap.sh script executes a remote installation script for the uv tool from astral.sh using a curl | sh pipeline. While originating from a well-known service, this pattern executes unverified code in the user's shell environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading and installing multiple third-party packages and binaries, including notebooklm-mcp-cli, notebooklm-py, and the Chromium browser via Playwright, expanding the local attack surface.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on shell command execution via Bash scripts and Python's subprocess module to manage external CLI tools and environment configurations.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages and references sensitive authentication data, specifically Google account session cookies stored in ~/.notebooklm, which are required for the tool's core functionality but represent a sensitive data management responsibility.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 23, 2026, 02:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — notebooklm