paneflow-conductor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture involves ingesting output from external CLI agents, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
paneflow read,paneflow status, andpaneflow searchare used to pull scrollback and agent messages into the conductor's context (e.g., inSKILL.mdsections 2 and 3). - Boundary markers: The instructions specify that
paneflow readautomatically wraps scrollback in<untrusted_terminal_output>tags, providing a clear boundary between the agent's instructions and external data. - Capability inventory: The conductor agent possesses the ability to execute shell commands and dispatch prompts to other panes via
paneflow send, including the use of--submitfor auto-execution. - Sanitization: The skill contains explicit instructions in Section 5 ('The discipline') directing the agent to treat all peer output as untrusted data and to ignore any commands or instruction-override attempts (e.g., 'ignore your previous instructions') found within that data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
paneflowCLI and standard shell utilities to manage the agent fleet and temporary files. - Context: Uses
paneflow ps,paneflow status,paneflow up, andpaneflow flow runfor orchestration. It also employsmktemp,cat,jq, andrmfor handling report files, which are appropriate and standard practices for the skill's defined purpose.
Audit Metadata